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Interest Groups, Contracts and
Interest Analysis
by Erin O'Hara*
and
Larry E. Ribstein**
Interest analysis does not stand up well under economic analysis.
Richard Posner has noted that the territorial approach to choice-of-law
rules reflected in the First Restatement enabled states at least roughly
to exercise their comparative regulatory advantages.' Moreover, a
system of rules enables parties to better predict the outcomes of
disputes. This better facilitates settlement than a standard as difficult
to apply as interest analysis. Most fundamentally, trying to determine
the interest of a state separate from the generally conflicting private
interests of politicians, voters, and other elements of the political process
is utterly foreign to contemporary public choice economics. In fact, the
seemingly outmoded FirstRestatement approach generally makes better
economic sense, among other reasons because, as discussed below in Part
II, it enables states to limit the effectiveness of rent-seeking through
interest group bargains. Though the First Restatement rules are
imperfect and rest on a questionable theoretic foundation, they are not
as arbitrary as advocates of interest analysis think.
Part " I argues, in light of public choice theory, that interest analysis
increases the inefficiency of laws by enhancing interest groups' ability
to extract benefits from less powerful out of state groups. Part II
proposes to respond to this problem with a version of the First Restate* Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law.
** GMU Foundation Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law.
Funding was provided by the GMU Law & Economics Center. Valuable comments were

provided by Professors Harold S. Lewis and Bruce Posnak.
1. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 587 (4th ed. 1992) (advocating
application of the FirstRestatement's "territorial" approach to choice of law partly on the
ground that the jurisdiction local to the transaction has a comparative regulatory
advantage in determining the appropriate rules).
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ment rule-based approach, modified so as to better foster interstate
competition by enabling parties to choose their governing law to a
greater extent than any existing choice-of-law approach permits. Part
III applies our analysis to some of the cases discussed in this Symposium.

I. THE PROBLEM: PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY AND INTEREST ANALYSIS
Interest analysts claim to be primarily concerned with facilitating the
state's interest in passing a law. As David Currie points out, this is
really a matter of statutory interpretation.2 Traditional interest
analysis assumed that all laws had one or more of three primary
purposes: 1) protecting defendants; 2) compensating plaintiffs; and 3)
regulating conduct." This analysis fails to take into account many
potential interests that a state might have and to recognize that most
states attempt to balance (albeit in different ways) the same concerns.
However, this artificial approach at least allowed some ex ante
predictability regarding the outcomes of disputes.
Courts applying interest analysis attempt to discern in light of the
legislature's purpose whether it would have wanted the law applied to
the facts of a particular multistate dispute. But public choice theory
shows that the legislature's real intent cannot easily be gleaned by
concocting some hypothetical public purpose. Laws may instead promote
the wealth or utility of strong interest groups that can organize cheaply
and effectively to raise and spend money and other political resources.4
These groups may not be the public, or even the majority, but rather
small minorities whose members share the burdens as well as benefits
of political action because they overcome members' temptations to "free
ride" on the work and money of others.' Thus, laws may not be efficient
even in the limited "Kaldor-Hicks"' sense that the proponent group's
gains from the law outweigh losses to the rest of society.'

2. Transcript, Choice of Law: How It Ought To Be, 48 MERCER L. REV. 639, 649, 652
(1997).
3. See LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS 67 (2d ed. 1995).
4. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
5. For discussions of the importance of free riding in interest group theory see ROBERT
MCCORMICK & ROBERT TOLLISON, POLITICIANS, LEGISLATIONS AND THE ECONOMY (1981);
Robert Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339 (1988).
6. See Jonathan Macey, Promoting Public-RegardingLegislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLuM. L. REV. 223, 228 n.28 (1986).
7. The task of determining whether a law in fact benefits a narrow interest group
rather than the public as a whole is often impossible. Legislators rarely if ever
acknowledge any but a public interest motive. See Macey, supra note 6, at 223. Moreover,
markets are rarely either perfectly competitive or perfectly monopolistic, and the
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Interest analysis not only ignores public choice theory but may, in the
light of this theory, exacerbate the problem of inefficient laws. At some
point the "tax" imposed on weaker interest groups becomes so large that
it exceeds the cost of organizing voters in opposition to the law.8 But,
where the losers reside outside the enacting state, they lose their voting
weapon (although, to be sure, other forms of political pressure can cross
state lines), which makes it harder for them to overcome the winner's
inherent advantage. Interest analysis makes it more likely that laws
will be applied against such outsiders. For example, suppose state C has
few manufacturers and wants to impose more products liability than is
optimal (i.e., more than consumers would be willing to buy). The
legislature may pass the law in the absence of voting pressure from
those aligned with manufacturers. Interest analysis helps promote this
result by ensuring application of the law by state C courts to local
consumers, but not necessarily against local manufacturers, most of
whose customers may live outside the state. Even if the court is willing
to apply local law to an out of state plaintiff, the latter may be deterred
from taking advantage of the bias by the need to travel and hire local
counsel. Thus, interest analysis facilitates inefficient laws by imposing
the costs of those laws on people and firms who have no direct vote.9
Interest analysis poses difficulties even when legislation is KaldorHicks efficient. Consider, for example, Oregon's spendthrift law,' °
which was applied in Lilienthal v. Kaufman," a case discussed in this
Symposium. As pointed out by Richard Posner in his defense of the
First Restatement, state laws serve the differing environments of the
various states. 2 This is obviously true of speed limits, but might even
be true of spendthrift laws. Suppose that spendthrift laws make sense
in rural areas where most contracting is between parties who know one
another and therefore know whether the other party is a spendthrift.
In contrast, spendthrift laws may be less suited to large communities

elasticities of supply and demand in any market are usually unknown. Thus, it is difficult

to determine the incidence of burdens and benefits to legislation once market effects are
taken into account.
8. See Gary Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political
Influence, 98 Q. J. ECON. 371 (1983).
9. For a similar argument, see Michael W. McConnell, A Choice of Law Approach to
Products Liability Reform, in NEW DIRECTIONs IN LIABILITY LAw 90 (Walter Olson ed.
1988). But see Bruce Hay, Conflicts of Law and State Competition in'the ProductLiability
System, 80 GEO. L.J. 617 (1992) (arguing that interest analysis leads to less expansive
products liability than did the FirstRestatement).
10.

OR. REV. STAT. § 126.280 (1961) (repealed 1973).

11. 395 P.2d 543 (1964).
12. POSNER, supra note 1.
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because anonymity allows spendthrifts to take advantage of sellers who
have no advance notice that they are dealing with a spendthrift. Thus,
a relatively rural state such as Oregon may protect its spendthrifts,
while a state with more large urban communities such as California may
not. Lilienthal, by allowing an Oregon spendthrift to reach into a more
urban state to take advantage of a California creditor, was arguably an
inefficient application of an otherwise efficient law.
In sum, interest analysis causes two fundamental types of problems.
First, interest analysis may increase the likelihood of rent-seeking
legislation. Second, where different state laws are efficient in different
environments, interest analysis impedes states' abilities to effectuate
their comparative regulatory advantages.
II. THE SOLUTION: A MODIFIED FIRST RESTATEMENT APPROACH
The original Restatement of Conflicts (the "FirstRestatement")3 has
been denounced by most modern choice-of-law scholars as an arbitrary
set of rules based on unsound theory.'4 The initial theoretical justification for the First Restatement is, indeed, faulty. But the FirstRestatement does offer a promising starting point, particularly in light of public
choice theory, if it is modified to make better use of parties' contracts
regarding choice of law.
The FirstRestatement is premised on the theory that substantive legal
rights vest in a particular state, and only that state can determine the
extent of the rights. For example, tort rights vest according to the law
of the state where a person is injured, the validity of contracts is
determined by the place where the contract was formed, and rights to
real property are created only at the situs of the property. But there is
no a priori reason why states' powers should stop at their borders as
prescribed by vested rights theory. 5 Moreover, the exclusive focus on
the state's sovereign powers ignores the parties' interests in prescribing
rules governing their relationship and thereby maximizing the value of
their bargains.
The First Restatement might nevertheless be an efficient approach
despite its vested rights foundation. In torts, for example, courts and
legislators near the place of an accident are often most aware of local
conditions and therefore are the rulemakers who are best situated to
determine appropriate levels of care. Also, contracting parties are likely

13.

RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934).

14.

See generally LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS 25-31 (2d ed. 1995).

See Transcript, supra note 2, at 652 (comments of Professor Currie criticizing
American Law Institute's assertion that governing law was "brooding omnipresence in the
sky").
15.
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to have notice of the law of the place of contracting and may be unduly
burdened by having to inquire into the home state of everyone with
whom they do business. Moreover, applying the law of the place of
contracting affords an opportunity to exit from laws that unduly burden
particular transactions or that attempt to transfer wealth from weaker
to stronger interest groups. Thus, although interest analysis may take
care of the "hard cases" under the First Restatement, it does so by
undermining a fundamentally sound set of rules.
The FirstRestatement is, however, far from perfect. To the extent the
imperfections apply to rare interstate fact scenarios, the costs of the
First Restatement are relatively low. Where the First Restatement
causes systematic problems, it can be reformulated to remove the
imperfections. We propose two types of changes. First, and perhaps
most fundamentally, courts should enhance party choice by enforcing
contractual choice-of-law and forum clauses rather than forcing parties
to reside or contract in another state in order to avail themselves of its
rules. 6 This approach would increase the efficiency of legal rules by
enhancing parties' ability to avoid burdensome laws through exit and
thereby empower individuals who might otherwise have little "voice" in
the political process. 7
Second, even where contractual choice of law is not likely to be
effective, the First Restatement should be modified in some cases to
better promote efficient jurisdictional competition. Specifically, the
courts should choose the applicable law so as to maximize the parties'
ability to determine the laws governing their behavior prior to the
conduct that gives rise to litigation.
As an example' of how this approach would be applied, consider a case
based on a defective product. Under our approach, courts should apply
the law of the point of sale."8 This rule would permit manufacturers
to choose where to sell the product and how much to charge based on the
applicable liability rule, and allow consumers to determine the applicable law by choosing where to buy. Manufacturers could avoid oppressive
liability regimes by refusing to sell in states that adopt such rules.
Manufacturers would not be subject to forum rules whose application the

16. See generally Larry E. Ribstein, Choosing Law By Contract, 18 J. CORP. L. 245
(1993). As discussed in the foregoing article, enforcement of contractual choice of law may
depend on enforcement of the parties' contractual choice of forum because courts have
strong incentives to enforce the law of the forum and, as discussed below, this result is
encouraged by application of interest analysis.
17. See generallyALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970); Charles M.
Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
18. See McConnell, supra note 9 for a similar argument.
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manufacturer could neither predict nor exit just because the product
happened to be used or resold in the forum. Where the manufacturer
claims its product was resold in a state without its consent, or even
contrary to its consent, the court might determine under principles
similar to those that apply under long-arm statutes whether the
manufacturer subjected itself to the state's law. Though a point-ofmanufacture rule might seem better from the manufacturer's standpoint,
consumers could not easily determine what law will apply, particularly
where the product is sold by a little-known company or one that owns or
buys from factories all over the world. Moreover, the manufacturer is
usually in a better position than the consumer to contract around the
default rule, such as for the law of the place of manufacture. 'Because
in competitive markets manufacturers ultimately will bear some of the
consumers' information and contracting costs, manufacturers as a whole
might prefer a default rule that does not impose significant 'costs on
consumers.
Our approach is likely to differ most sharply from interest analysis
with respect to application of forum law. The forum can be any state
that has enough contacts with defendants to create a predicate for
jurisdiction. These contacts may be so insubstantial that a defendant
who does not wish to be subject to a state's laws cannot easily structure
its affairs to avoid application of the law. By contrast, under our rule,
the applicable law is more likely to be one that the parties deliberately
selected, or at least could have assumed would apply if they had
considered the matter.19 Interest analysis promotes jurisdictional
competition for litigation over conduct or contracting that has already
occurred. 20 By contrast, our rule promotes competition over the rules
that will govern the parties' future conduct or contracts. Because the
parties can tailor their conduct in light of existing laws, a rule that
promotes competition over such laws is more likely to lead to efficient
rules than one that promotes competition for litigation over past conduct
or contracts.

19. In other words, as discussed above, although the competition-maximizing rule
satisfies minimum jurisdictional contacts, these contacts are not enough to satisfy our rule.
See Transcript, supra note 2, at 711 (comments of Professor Lewis arguing that the
Constitution should apply to choice of law as it does to jurisdiction).
20. See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 527 (1990) (noting Mississippi's
incentive to attract litigation through long statute of limitations).
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III.

APPLICATION TO SPECIFIC CASES

In this Part we apply our analysis to a few of the cases discussed in
the Symposium. We consider three: Erwin v. Thomas,2 1 Hurtado v.
Superior Court of Sacramento County,2 and Rosenthal v. Warren.2"
A.

Erwin v. Thomas

Residents of Washington who were injured in Washington by a truck
owned and operated by Oregonians sued in Oregon.24 Oregon allows
recovery for loss of consortium while Washington does not.25 The court
held that there was a "false conflict" and therefore applied forum law,
reasoning that, as Washington sought only to protect Washington
defendants from consortium claims and Oregon protected only Oregonian
plaintiffs, "neither state has a vital interest in the outcome of this
litigation and there can be no conceivable material conflict of policies or
interests if an Oregon court does what comes naturally and applies
Oregon, law."26
Applying the law of the place of the tort in this case would maximize
competition. The court's interest analysis amounts to an ad hoc finding
of an unprovided for case followed by application of the law of the state
where the suit happened to have been brought. It is far from clear why
the court concluded that Washington's judicial no-consortium rule was
only for the protection of Washington resident defendants. If, as the
court said, Washington has made the policy judgment that defendants
should not have: to pay for the loss of consortium," why would the
legislature want this policy applied only to Washingtonians? Given that
this analysis is ad hoc, people cannot determine the law applicable to
their conduct until after it has caused an injury and the case has been
tried and appealed. Indeed, systematic choice of forum law by default
encourages ex post jurisdictional choice by forum shopping.2 States
may compete for litigation by giving plaintiffs damages for loss of
consortium litigation. This would benefit in-state trial lawyers at the
expense of defendants, many of whom may be nonresidents. By contrast,

21. 506 P.2d 494 (1973).
22. 522 P.2d 666 (1974).
23. 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1973).
24. 506 P.2d at 495.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 496-97.
27. Id. at 496.
28. See Transcript, supra note 2, at 716 (comments of Professor Felix noting the forumshopping problem).
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applying the law of the place of the tort, because it is usually the place
of plaintiff's residence, allows people to choose where to live and where
to travel based on governing law. To the extent that consortium laws
make a difference to people, as by reinforcing the marriage relationship
or penalizing tortfeasors, our rule facilitates competition toward more
efficient laws rather than toward more litigation and forum shopping.
B.

Hurtado v. Superior Court of Sacramento County

Mexican citizens sued California residents in California for wrongful
death of a Mexican citizen in a California automobile accident.29 The
court held that Mexico had no interest in applying its damage limitation
rule,3" which was intended to protect Mexican defendants. Moreover,
California had an interest in deterring wrongs in the state as well as in
protecting survivors of decedents.3" As a consequence, the California
forum should apply its own damage rule. 2
Under our approach, the court reached the right result (place of the
tort) for the wrong reason (interest analysis). The court's reasoning
matters because application of the same reasoning could produce the
wrong result-application of California law to the death of a Californian
in a Mexican accident. This would therefore prevent any effective
competition among states regarding damage limitation. For example,
under our approach, Mexico could apply low personal injury ceilings to
local accidents in order to encourage tourism. Though this idea was
derided by Symposium participants,3 3 jurisdictions should be able to
compete on this basis as long as the costs and benefits of the rule are
brought to bear on the participants in the political process that enacts
the law. The idea of a competition may seem far-fetched in the Hurtado
scenario, but the same choice-of-law rule would promote competition in
the more realistic context of, for example, the location decision of a firm
that engages in repeated litigation.
C. Rosenthal v. Warren
A New York citizen sued, in the federal court in New York, a
Massachusetts hospital and surgeon who had a worldwide practice. 4
The court refused to apply a Massachusetts damage limitation in

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34,

522 P.2d at 668.
Id. at 670.
Id. at 671.
Id. at 670-71.
See Transcript, supra note 2, at 718-19.
475 F.2d at 439,
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wrongful death cases,3" and this was upheld on appeal.3 The court,
applying New York conflicts law and after reviewing the case law,
including that dealing with guest statutes, concluded that "the strong
New York public policy against damage limitations has triumphed over
the contrary policies of sister states in every case where a New York
domiciliary has brought suit." 7 Although Massachusetts was both the
place of tort and place of contract, the court said that "[iut is thus
impossible to say with any certainty what the parties' actual 'expectations' as to choice of law were." 8 The parties' conduct was not "patterned upon the Massachusetts death limitation," 9 the insurance policy
had no locality limitation,"0 and the doctor and the hospital attracted
a worldwide clientele.41 In any event, the court dismissed as irrelevant
any expectations the parties might have had, stating that the "contractual type of approach to multistate tort problems has been 'summarily
rejected by the New York Court of Appeals."42 Instead, the court held
that New York's interest in protecting its domiciliaries would outweigh
any interest Massachusetts had in the outmoded approach to limiting
damages for all wrongful death in malpractice and all other types of tort
cases.43 Nor was Massachusetts' interest sufficient to compel New York
to recognize it as a matter of full faith and credit."
Under our approach this type of case presents some difficulty. Given
the parties' direct dealings and the contractual nature of malpractice,
this is not clearly a tort case, as the court assumes, but rather a hybrid
of tort and contract. But this particular case is easy because the place
Instead of being
of tort and the place of contract are the same.
irrelevant as the court suggests, ex ante expectations should be the key
to solving the conflicts problem.4" As noted above, the place-of-contract
rule most readily gives notice of the applicable law at the outset of the

35. Id. at 438.
36. Id. at 443.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 444.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id,
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 446.
45. Id. at 440.
46. Expectations are also potentially relevant to the defendant's ability to insure. See
Transcript, supra note 2, at 707. As the court pointed out, defendants had a national
clientele and, apparently, a national insurance policy. However, the type of policy, and

accordingly the cost of insurance, might have been dictated by the uncertainty of the
conflicts rule.

774

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

parties' dealings. Although the parties presumably are equally able to
determine the law of each party's domicile, or of the forum, or of where
the contract is to be performed, once interest analysis departs from a
place-of-contract rule the parties cannot know in advance which of these
various laws will be applied. The parties can agree to a choice-of-law
clause, but this is not a complete solution even if the parties are sure the
clause will be enforced because whether the costs of negotiating and
contracting for the clause are justified depends on the default rule.
This case illustrates the potential advantages of promoting competition. The wrongful death limit, instead of being an anachronism as the
court assumes, may reflect a victory of defense-oriented interest groups,
such as doctors, against plaintiff interests, particularly including the
plaintiffs' bar. By contrast, the New York rule may represent the
opposite outcome.47 But neither rule is clearly efficient. Rather, the
efficient outcome is most likely to emerge from a competition between
the rules fostered by the appropriate choice-of-law rule.
V. CONCLUSION
Interest analysis, viewed in the light of contemporary public choice
theory, is far from the "modern" approach its advocates claim. Rather,
analyzed in light of modern public choice theory, it can be seen to
promote a perverse sort of jurisdictional competition that results in
inefficient rules. We would substitute rules based loosely on the First
Restatement that promote an efficiency-maximizing form ofjurisdictional
competition. The cases discussed in this Symposium demonstrate the
weakness of interest analysis and the strengths of our approach. In this
case, it is the old ways that work best.

47. These conclusions would, of course, have been clearer if the damage limitation had
applied only to malpractice actions.

